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THE SECOND COMING OF CARE
KATHRYN ABRAMS*
Lucie White opens a narrative of hope with a moment of
ambivalence.1 A new conversation about care has emerged among
feminist legal scholars, and White is unsure about its prospects. A
decade of anti-essentialist critiques, global economic changes, and
gay-lesbian reconceptualizations of care, sexuality, and gender, have
made it possible to approach the topic from less unitary, more
encompassing perspectives. But the "polarities of modernist ration-
ality" threaten to reorient feminist discussion around the same
dichotomies -work/care, self/other, man/woman, sameness/differ-
ence-that stalled the debate over care in its last incarnation. White's
idea is to disrupt this emerging polarization by moving the debate
from the legal conceptual domain to the domain of ethnographic
description. Her narrative about the effect of caregiving on the lives
of Head Start mothers frames the debate in new terms, and shows the
care of others to be a vehicle for empowering oneself.
In this Commentary, I reflect on White's work in two ways. In
the first part of the Commentary, I offer a contrasting perspective on
the re-emergence of care. I argue that the first wave of feminist legal
arguments about care were marred not only by their depiction of care
as a moral or cognitive attribute reflecting women's essence, but by
their failure to conduce readily to viable remedial strategies. Care-
based characterizations did not conform to the most successful forms
of antidiscrimination claims, such as rights-based claims for equality.
Perhaps more importantly, the kinds of normative or remedial claims
that followed most readily from a care focus -accommodation of
nondominant life patterns or reconceptualization of certain areas of
doctrine according to care-based norms-were often undermined by a
feminization and devaluation of care within dominant institutions and
norms, a devaluation that was rarely analyzed within early care
* Professor of Law, University of California-Berkeley School of Law; Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School.
1. See Lucie E. White, Raced Histories, Mother Friendships, and the Power of Care:
Conversations with Women in Project Head Start, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1569 (2001).
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theories themselves. The second coming of care reflects a promising
improvement on this flawed position: care is no longer framed as an
attribute supporting an essentialist characterization of women. It is
now recognized as a complex set of practices that are structured,
supported, and incentivized by a range of institutional decisions and
social norms, and that differentiate and position women in relation to
each other. Moreover, the marginalized position of care and
caregivers, and the relation of this marginality to patterns of gender
oppression, have been carefully articulated as part of the feminist
discourse on the topic. The new remedial arguments derived from an
emphasis on care thus acknowledge and respond to the possibility of
care's devaluation. Yet these second-generation arguments remain
challenging to translate into conventional claims for legal inter-
vention: they still elude rights-based arguments of comparability and,
understood in their broadest implications, they require major
restructuring of institutional relationships.
Lucie White's account of Head Start, as I argue in the second
part of the Commentary, may help us vindicate the promise of this
second phase of care discourse, by broadening our thinking about the
relation of law to the activities of care. White's account of care is
interestingly transitional: it regards care as having a moral dimension,
but also views it as a practice that is contextually organized and
potentially transformative for those involved. Similarly, it straddles
and problematizes some of the very dichotomies -care and work, self
and others-of which White warns. Caregiving, in her article, occurs
in an institutional setting that many participants recognize as a place
of work; and the process of making oneself regularly present to
another, that White identifies as the heart of care, ultimately enables
the caregiver to exercise agency in her own life and greater power in
the social world. Perhaps most importantly, White describes the
emergence of care as facilitated by legal structures: in this case the
federal regulations that require Head Start centers to promote the
education and development of parents of Head Start children. Her
example thus suggests a new set of possible relations between law and
those human activities, including care, that are the focus of feminist
thought.
[Vol. 76:1605
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I. TWO MOMENTS IN CARE ARGUMENTATION
A. Early Arguments about Care
In its first incarnation, the feminist legal focus on care was part of
a larger project of characterizing women, differentiating them from
men, and challenging the institutional structures to which women had
gained access both as participants and as interpreters. Carol Gilligan
may have offered her pathbreaking analysis2 to challenge the unitary
conceptual structure of developmental psychology. But, as taken up
in law, Gilligan's thesis represented a way of articulating those
attributes of women that were specific to the sex, rather than inherent
in the universal legal subject (a subject who was formally unmarked,
but, to feminists, increasingly recognizable as male). Care was an
emanation from women, an expression of their essence that was not,
in this early period, analyzed in its concrete particulars. Women's
orientation toward care was manifested in a series of paradigmatic
settings: nurturing a child,3 placing concern for others above concern
for oneself,4 performing tasks collaboratively rather than competi-
tively or individualistically,5 and analyzing problems relationally
rather than hierarchically or in zero-sum fashion.6 But these settings
were presented generically-the child to be nurtured had no
particularized identity-and they were removed from their broader
social context: that is, feminists rarely focused their attention on how
these expressions of care were perceived or valued by dominant
institutions or actors in society.
These features of early accounts of care ultimately created
difficulties for their feminist legal proponents. The essentialism of
first-generation arguments about care was the most frequent target,
although this objection took various forms. Some feminists observed
that this ostensibly far-reaching characterization did not apply to
them: they did not have children; they did not count care or sacrifice
2. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 1-4, 24-63 (1982).
3. See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986).
4. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988).
5. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (describing women lawyers working
together, over food, on a brief).
6. See GILLIGAN, supra note 2, at 25-39 (discussing cognitive processes associated with
male and female subjects, Jake and Amy).
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for others among the central activities of their lives; they did not
experience in their daily lives the relational thinking or the warm,
soft-focus glow of collaborative connection that leading theories of
care ascribed them. The acontextuality of many discussions of care
also fueled an anti-essentialist critique. Black feminists since
Sojourner Truth had suggested that the dichotomy between care and
work had never applied to the lives of women of color or working-
class white women, whose caregiving activities were not permitted to
be the predominant focus of their lives.7 Other feminists offered a
similar critique of the object-relations psychological theory that
served to ground an account of women as nurturing, relational beings
with permeable personal boundaries. "Black women's or Chicana's
raising of their children is informed by a kind or awareness and
wariness about the world that goes beyond an awareness of 'male
dominance' or 'gender role expectations,"' wrote Elizabeth V.
Spelman.8
Because mothering may be informed by a woman's knowledge of
more than one form of dominance, the development of gender
occurs in a context in which one learns to be a very particular girl or
boy, and not just simply a girl or boy. If we look at biographical
and autobiographical literature by and about women of various
races and classes, we get a much more complicated picture than
Chodorow's account gives us of the world in which mothers
mother.9
A less-discussed difficulty with early accounts of care is that they
failed to translate readily into effective strategies for legal reform.
This was true in part because some versions of the feminist focus on
care had no obvious legal entailments. When women's "difference"
was characterized as a relational approach to cognition or problem-
solving, for example, it was not clear what changes the law should
introduce. More importantly, where legal feminists did derive
remedial responses from a care-based view, these responses often
failed to achieve the desired results. Remedial responses based on
early arguments about care frequently took one of two forms: they
7. See BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981) (offering
Sojourner Truth and her famous message as emblematic of the often-unthinking marginali-
zation of African American women, particularly in cultural and other feminist accounts drawing
ona thiel ogy oftA315  "3Lsparate spheres"';3 see a lso LIC ESLER-H1 Sft, -L .....N /. V .
ALWAYS WORKED: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (1981) (arguing that for many women of color
or working-class women, caregiving activities never replaced the responsibility to perform
market work).
8. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT 98 (1988).
9. Id. at 97.
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sought institutional accommodation of women's "differences" (e.g.,
workplace accommodation of women's patterns of caregiving for
their children), or they sought to use the care-based morality ascribed
to women to revise particular bodies of doctrinal law (e.g., imposing a
duty to rescue in the area of tort). Advocates who chose to
emphasize women's difference had to forego the comparability-based
equality analysis that had proven most effective in the realm of anti-
discrimination law.10  Moreover, both legal efforts to secure
accommodation-themselves a viable, though not a primary, move
within anti-discrimination law-and efforts to reconstruct doctrine
along new normative lines faced a second, more serious difficulty.
Accommodation and doctrinal reorientation are most likely to
succeed where there is generalized social approval-or at least fully-
recognized ambivalence-about the norms to be accommodated.
Neither of these conditions obtained in most remedial contexts
involving care-based norms. While caregiving and relational thinking
have often received lip-service from dominant groups-a remnant
perhaps of the formal veneration of the separate, domestic sphere-
they are systematically feminized and, as such, have frequently been
devalued. And they are particularly likely to be devalued in the
context of a masculinized institution or body of analysis, where other
sets of norms hold sway. Thus the types of innovations proposed by
feminist advocates of difference were often marginalized within the
very institutions into which they were introduced: the incompletely
integrated and often devalued "mommy track" is a prime example.
Early accounts of care had few analytic resources for dealing with this
problem: while they featured elaborate arguments about the nature
and sources of women's orientation toward caregiving, they often left
the question of the social valuation of this orientation undiscussed or
untheorized." Thus the marginalization of the very approaches
intended to be the instruments of women's vindication was neither
anticipated nor successfully addressed in these early accounts. 2
10. These arguments, which originated in race-based anti-discrimination claims, often took
the form: "X group has the opportunity to do A. Y group is comparable to X group. Therefore
Y group should have the opportunity to do A."
11. There are obviously exceptions to this proposition. Carol Gilligan, for example, notes
the impatience of developmental psychological researchers with the responses given by young
girls reflecting Gilligan's "different" or relational voice, and the impact this impatience often
had on their subjects. See GILLIGAN, supra note 2, at 27-32. But societal devaluation of
women's difference is far less salient or fully theorized as a theme than the contours of that
difference itself.
12. Even one of the most sophisticated difference-based theories, the "equality as
acceptance" approach of Christine Littleton, which explicitly recognized the devaluation of the
20011
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The systematic accounts of androcentrism that might have
analyzed and predicted such outcomes were in fact emerging on the
feminist legal landscape. Yet they were frequently incorporated in
larger theories that shifted feminist attention from questions of care.
The dominance theory of Catharine MacKinnon, 13 which achieved
almost unparalleled prominence in the late 1980s, is a good example) 4
MacKinnon paired equality and difference feminisms -previously
thought to be opposing visions-as two sides of the same coin: both
framed questions of equality as questions of ontology ("is X group
the same or different?") rather than politics; and both were premised
on an unarticulated assumption that man was the measure of all
things."5 Of care-based accounts in particular, MacKinnon argued
that women learned to value care because caring for men was what
they were valued for, and to emphasize women's orientation toward
care without emphasizing the context of constraining social
construction in which it emerged was an "insult to [women's]
possibilities.' 6 Yet having contained and critiqued the "differences"
approach, MacKinnon juxtaposed to it her "dominance" view, in
which women's inequality and differentiation are the product of their
systematic sexualized domination by men. The dominance approach
succeeded not only in curtailing discussion of care-based difference,
but in shifting the substantive focus from questions such as workplace
accommodation of childrearing, to issues such as sexual harassment,
rape, and pornography, in which the sexualized domination and
terrorization of women was most immediately evident.
feminine as part of the phenomenon of sex and gender-based discrimination, fails to glimpse
this difficulty. See Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 1043 (1987). Littleton advocates interpretation of the equality norm as entailing equality
across differences, meaning, for example, that there should be equal workplace treatment of
different life patterns with respect to parenting. What Littleton does not appear to anticipate is
that the devaluation of the feminine that she accurately diagnoses is likely to distort the equal
accommodation of women's life patterns, even when such accommodation is legally required,
producing phenomena like the "mommy track" in which the equality of the separate track is
undermined by the devaluation of the work performed by those on and, indeed, the reasons for
creating, the separate track.
13. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINE MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST TIEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
14. For an example of a feminist theory of androcentrism, outside the field of law, that
does not reflect MacKinnon's unitary focus on sexualized dominance, see SANDRA LiPs1TZ
BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY
(1993).
15. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 13, at 34.
16. Id. at 39.
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Yet while the claims and critiques of dominance theory were
preoccupying feminist legal scholars, feminist scholars in other fields
were shifting emphases and addressing defects in earlier arguments
about care. Theorists such as philosopher Sara Ruddick 7 charac-
terized care not as an emanation from or essence of women, but as a
practice in which many women and some men engaged, that formed
particular habits of mind and orientations toward others through the
activities of nurturance of and concern for particular others. Other
scholars, such as political theorist Joan Tronto, 8 worked to concretize
and situate care, by describing systematic ways in which various
categories of caregivers had been marginalized. Each of these efforts
helped to shape the new understandings through which a concern
with care would re-emerge among legal feminists.
B. The Second Coming of Care
By the mid 1990s a concern with care began to resurface among
feminist legal scholars. This focus coincided with growing analytic
and practical doubts about dominance feminism as a fully adequate
vehicle for addressing women's oppression. Not only had the
dominance approach been problematized as essentialist 19 and as
understating women's potential for agency,20 but its persistent focus
on sexuality was also challenged as inadequate to address a range of
issues that reflected the gendering and the oppression of women, 21
foremost among them the care of children and other dependents.
17. See SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1989).
18. See JOAN C. TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN
ETHIC OF CARE (1993).
19. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990).
20. This has been analyzed as a problem that risks undermining both women's resistance,
see, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995); Martha Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives,
Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE 59 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994), and
women's understanding of their implication in social processes such as the construction of race,
see, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, in Practice and Theory: A Reply to
Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217 (1993) [hereinafter Mahoney, Whiteness
and Women].
21. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000) (critiquing restricted scope of dominance focus); Mahoney,
Whiteness and Women, supra note 20, at 239 (noting insights gained by shifting the frame of
feminist inquiry from sexuality-based contexts to questions such as housework and the
availability of credit).
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These questions, and the new orientation toward care that they
reflected, were provocatively framed and reintroduced by Martha
Fineman in her book, The Neutered Mother.22 Fineman looked at
mothering as a complex, socially constructed practice that provided a
window into women's "gendered lives. '23 Whether performed by
biological men or biological women, "mothering" is concerned with
the care of dependents, a practice that Fineman-resisting both the
dichotomization of care and work and the naturalization of care-has
labeled "dependency work." The Neutered Mother explores the ways
in which dependency work is socially devalued and institutionally
undersupported through the conceptualization of the family around
the "sexual dyad" rather than the "mother-child (or dependency)
dyad. '2 4 In The Neutered Mother, and in subsequent work,25 Fineman
has investigated the ways in which that work is differentially
constructed and subsidized for different groups of women, and erased
or undersupported by government policy, workplace regulations, and
operations of the market.
The new approach to care initiated by Fineman's work is evident
in many of the contributions to this Symposium. The question is not,
as it has been in the past: What is the orientation toward care
(manifested by women) and how does it compare to the orientations
(toward logical hierarchies, toward autonomous pursuit of
individualized goals, etc.) reflected in dominant culture, particular
institutions, or specific bodies of legal doctrine? The critical
questions have proliferated, and they assume a complex, contextually
differentiated practice, that can be shaped by many different
institutional and social influences and represented and understood
from many different perspectives. Feminists engaged in the most
recent round of theorizing about care are more likely to ask: What
kinds of activities or commitments comprise the practices of
caregiving? How do these differ in different contexts? By whom is it
done? And for whom is this caregiving performed? How is it
represented or subsidized or incentivized? And by whom? And
why? How might it be performed, represented, subsidized,
22- See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
23. See id. at 47-48.
24. See id. at 226-36.
25. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1403
(2001); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (2000).
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incentivized, and combined with other life activities, differently than
it is now?
These emerging approaches to the interrogation and exploration
of care ameliorate many of the defects of the earlier feminist
discussions. The elaborate contextualization of more recent work
mitigates claims of essentialism: these investigations do not seem to
assume a normative caregiver, and they reflect the distinctive
circumstances of many groups of women.26 The extension of feminist
investigation beyond the dependency work of biological women also
short circuits earlier debates over whether and how it makes sense to
talk about a woman's essence. Moreover, because dependency work
is not an emanation from women or a manifestation of innate being,
but is rather a variable practice subject to multiple vectors of social
formation, the ways in which it is represented, devalued, and
undersupported are rendered explicit and fully theorized in most of
these accounts. This not only provides a previously absent element of
context; it also assists in the remedial enterprise, because theorists can
anticipate and resist efforts to marginalize or undermine interventions
grounded in nondominant understandings of care or dependency. An
explanation of the ways that state agencies are likely to misconstrue
the kinship networks often deployed in the raising of African
American children, for example, forms an explicit part of Dorothy
Roberts's argument, in her contribution to this Symposium.2 7
Yet notwithstanding this last gain, the path to remedial
implementation of the emerging feminist perspectives promises to be
rocky. The pluralization and radical contextualization of different
accounts of care will make analogically grounded rights claiming even
more difficult. Perhaps more important, arguments such as those of
Fineman or Roberts, require largescale restructurings of social
institutions. When caregiving ceases to be an emanation that must be
accommodated and becomes a range of practices that must be
rendered visible, subsidized, legitimated, and deployed as a basis for
restructuring existing institutions, the transformation required fully to
support these practices is profound. Fineman, straightforwardly
26. Katherine Franke has recently argued, however, that while these accounts may not
assume a normative caregiver, they do assume that caregiving is normative and erase or
marginalize the experiences of women who are not involved in dependency work, and do not
conceptualize sex, even in part, as a vehicle for reproduction. See Katherine M. Franke,
Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183-97
(2001) (critiquing "repronormativity" of feminist work focusing on dependency).
27. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1619, 1632-33 (2001).
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acknowledging the magnitude of the undertaking, has focused on
initial steps, such as the removal of state sanction from the institution
of marriage or the commencement of a national dialogue on the
undersubsidization and erasure of dependency work. If the emerging
feminist engagement about care is not to be sidelined, once again, by
its uncomfortable fit with conventional, often incremental approaches
to legal change, feminists will have to challenge mainstream
understandings about the role of law in producing progressive social
change at the same time as they challenge dominant understandings
about dependency work. In this task, the work of Lucie White may
play a useful, instigating role.
II. CARE AND THE ENABLING STRUCTURES OF LAW
In Raced Histories, Mother-Friendships, and the Power of Care,28
White offers an evocative, and sometimes puzzling, account of the
ways that a particular kind of care operates in the lives of women
involved with Project Head Start. She describes two lives that are
transformed by the caregiving of another. Care here connotes not
simply the physical aspects of dependency work, but what White
describes as "presence" - a careful witnessing and gradual compre-
hension of the life of another, which produces encouragement
through steady, accepting, often unspoken companionship. But, more
interestingly, she describes one life as being changed not simply by
the receiving but by the giving of this kind of care. E.M., a Head
Start parent volunteer, is empowered to reconsider and separate from
an abusive relationship with her husband, through her caring for two
children, in particular a traumatized young girl, whom she draws back
to the beginnings of an engagement with the world by the same
steady presence that the head teacher, J.G., demonstrates toward
E.M. herself. This form of caregiving, in short, not only enriches the
life of another, but permits E.M. to understand the need for action
and the possibility of agency in her own life.
White's account is emblematic of many things we might learn
about care, particularly in relation to what she calls the "polarities" of
the earlier care debates. Caregiving has a far broader domain than is
frequently assumed or described. White's narrative concerns
relations that take place in the context of work (paid work for some
and unpaid work for others, but not a domestic or familial relation in
28. White, supra note 1.
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any case). None of the caring relationships she describes involve a
parent and her own child, and one pivotal relationship is between two
adult peers (albeit momentarily in a teacher-student relationship).
More centrally, caregiving does not involve a unidirectional relation-
ship in which one only gives to others. Caregiving in White's Head
Start context is enabling: it is a way of strengthening and nurturing
oneself so that empowerment and resistance is possible.
It is an interesting feature of White's account that it is more
suggestive or evocative of possibilities than it is indicative of recurrent
(even contextually recurrent) patterns in the giving of care. This
quality may be traceable in some respects to the particularized,
ethnographic character of White's inquiry. But, paradoxically, it is
also traceable to an almost anachronistically essentialist aspect of
White's account. Care as "presence" occurs in a particularized
setting, to be sure; but it also seems to be present as almost an
emanation from the women involved. We learn surprisingly little
about how this "presence" emerges-a feature that makes it
reminiscent of the spiritual transformation of Head Start's typical
"change" story29 or of early accounts of care-with the exception of
one detail that, importantly, gestures toward a new understanding.
White tells us that these "mother-friendships" and other caring
relationships emerged in the context of a set of Head Start
regulations, which required that local projects administer programs
for the education and assistance of Head Start parents. She describes
Head Start's world as "literally brought into being by law," 30 but, on
reflection, offers a more qualified view. "[T]he rigid processes of
modernist public law," she notes, "are not very good at creating
lifeworlds.... What is it about Head Start's law, unlike that of many
other social programs, that has made it into a place where some low-
income women feel safe, cared for, and respected?" 31 The answer is
multifaceted and interestingly contingent. White explains:
Head Start's legal blueprint is unusual among child welfare
programs because of its explicit emphasis on the well-being and
development of the parents of Head Start children .... Head Start
centers are legally required to permit parents to come into their
children's classrooms as observers or volunteers. Parents must be
offered educational and enrichment activities, such as nutrition and
literacy classes. They must be included, as elected representatives,
in each Head Start center's governing policy council. And qualified
29. Id. at 1575.




parent volunteers must be given priority for staff positions. Among
these requirements, the [preference for parents in hiring for staff
positions] appears to be especially important .... because teachers
who started out as parent volunteers seem to be especially likely to
form intense mentoring relationships with younger Head Start
mothers....
... Such relationships are more likely to take off in programs
in which parent involvement is valued and supported beyond what
the law minimally requires. The law gives each Head Start grantee
great latitude to define its own priorities and custom-design its day-
to-day practices. Some local programs, like the Los Angeles Head
Start that I studied, consider the development of adults a key
objective. Such programs sometimes supplement their federal
dollars with funds specifically targeted to adults' well-being and
needs. These programs are likely to draw and keep teachers with
the life experience, therapeutic know-how, and long-term commit-
ment it takes to sustain ... cross-generational relationships ....
Yet even in programs that prioritize women's well-being, there
is no guarantee that any particular woman will get drawn into a
sustained relationship that enables significant change.
Researchers... have identified some of the features of individual
women's life histories, like the absence of severe trauma or a
positive relationship with a parent or caretaker, that increase the
chance that these women will be open to such relationships. Yet,
our most contextualized models of human development still leave
much about the interplay between the person, her evolving
relationships, and the social context unaccounted for.3"
It is important to note what White is, and is not, saying here.
Legal regulations requiring attention to adult development, plus
center-specific institutional practices that prioritize assistance to adult
women, plus life experience or personal characteristics among
participants that encourage the formation of close nurturing
connections, help some teachers to establish and some parent
volunteers to accept mentoring relationships in which the form of
care White describes might emerge. The role of law is not singular,
nor is it directly or predictably productive of the effects described.
"[T]he process of change," White stresses, "is ultimately embedded in
the mystery that marks our potential as living beings."33 One might
better describe the role of law as making possible-or increasing "the
chance that life-enhancing movement" will occur.34 But whether and
how such possibilities come to fruition depends on a range of factors
32 Id. at 1572-73 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 1573-74.
34. Id. at 1574.
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beyond the law, which implicate variations in context and in the
subjectivities of the actors involved.
This seems to me to be a fruitful and potentially broadening
concept of the role of law in producing social change, which feminists
might pursue not only in relation to care, but in relation to other
norms such as agency or desire that they have more recently sought to
vindicate.35  Law has too often been conceived as a means of
prohibiting or bringing single-handedly into being particular
arrangements or behaviors. This conception is plausible when formal
equal opportunity, or equal treatment within a particular institution,
is that goal that reformers seek. But applying this conception to a
project as vast as legitimating and supporting dependency work can
set feminist legal reformers up for failure, or frame remediation as a
daunting enterprise. This conception of law as single-handedly
productive also seems limited, and even crude, in the context of a
norm like care or desire that can emerge in so many ways, and in light
of what feminist and related theories have taught us about the
complex social formation of subjectivity. To view law as enabling is
not to deny its very concrete contributing role: law can enable by
removing constraints and, more importantly, by establishing material
conditions, shaping expectations, or creating entitlements. But it may
be best, in certain of the contexts on which feminists have begun to
focus, to view law simply as making possible (in both senses of that
word) certain practices, responses, or explorations. This approach
not only makes possible a broader, more plural view of legal
normativity; but it also acknowledges the limits of law in the face of
baffling, and ultimately enlivening human complexity.
35. Cf. Franke, supra note 26, at 208 (arguing that we should understand feminist legal
theory as "a set of legal analyses, frames, and supports that erect the enabling conditions for
sexual pleasure").
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